Are there acquisition and deal characteristics which develop informativeness more than others? Is the informativeness process the same between countries? To answer to these questions we use the concept of informativeness, as first developed by Roll (1988) . We consider a sample of mergers and acquisitions in the US and in Europe over the 2000-2011 period. We show that the disclosure process is not linked with abnormal returns at the announcement date. Informativeness improves globally. We show that the acquisition premium and the means of payment are particularly important in the disclosure process.
Introduction
A successful transfer of control can instigate a major change in the economic story of a firm. This is obviously true for the target company. It is also true for the acquirer who sets up a new economic project and/or strategy in a newly merged group. This new economic entity will have (relatively or largely) different plans and perspectives. Information is delivered during the acquisition process to the shareholders of the target company but also to the general public of investors and analysts. This information should be sensible enough to result in a completed deal. The price paid to buy the target shares, the means of payment, the business plans, qualitative information, and the media coverage are focused on the transaction and its further consequences. All these elements involve specific information which is linked with the firm.
Finally, after completion, this information becomes public and the level of informativeness of the stock price is expected to have increased. The research question is simple. Is it exact?
Are there acquisition and deal characteristics which develop informativeness more than others? Is the informativeness process the same between countries or economic areas in the world?
The traditional way to tackle this problem is to look at abnormal returns. Acquisition is a discretionary decisions and the market's immediate reaction is the usual criterion to check if its announcement effectively modifies the stock price. This traditional approach compares a signal, which is supposed to be positive, with expected positive abnormal returns. The latter will proxy the creation (or the destruction) of economic value ensuing from the transaction. We will not follow this approach but we prefer to use the idea of the informativeness of the market price. It refers to the private information content of stock prices after a transaction, not at its announcement date. Informativeness is measured by the non-synchronicity of the stock price with the market index. This was first proposed by Roll (1988) . Following his intuition, a lesser synchronicity between the stock price and the market return after a given event will indicate that the specific risk expands and incorporates new specific information.
A large amount of evidence supports the informational content captured by this measure in a given situation, and particularly, the amount of private information about firms. However it was neither used, nor empirically tested, in a framework of acquisition transactions.
Transfers of control are important event because they change the nature of the economic project of a firm by adding specific new perspectives or uncertainties in the future cashflows. We use a sample of mergers and acquisitions in the US and in Europe to empirically test if synchronicity increases or decreases before and after an acquisition. Over the 2000-2011 period, synchronicity decreased but this was not globally significant. What is important is the idiosyncratic decision to disclose private information during the acquisition process. We can show that the contractual variables are the most important to explain the disclosure of new and specific information. The terms of the deals, more precisely the acquisition premium and the means of payment, are key variables which convey a great deal of private information about the future perspectives ensuing from the deal. As such they increase the informativeness of the stock. A cumulative abnormal return at the announcement date is not a sufficient signal. It follows a different rationale and we show that it does not help to improve informativeness. This result is important as it shows that analyzing the consequence of an event based only on the stock abnormal moves is not enough. High premiums, cash payments, or mixed hybrid payments increase stock price informativeness. Our result shows also that the informativeness process is different and better in North America than in Europe. This paper is organized in four parts. Section 1 proposes a review of the literature, and Section 2 analyzes the concept of informativeness and introduces our hypotheses.
Variables and descriptive statistics are shown in Section 3. The empirical results are presented in Section 4. A conclusion follows.
Literature
The relevant literature comes from two different avenues of researches. Firstly we investigate how the concept of informativeness deals with the informational contents of the stock price in the market. Then we need to refer to the literature on mergers and acquisitions More precisely we will focus on the asymmetry of information problem when a transaction occurs as this specific and important event will entail the delivery of new information.
Informativeness
Informativeness can be defined as the disclosure of new specific information to the markets which is successfully incorporated in the stock price. Non synchronicity as a measure of informativeness has been successfully tested. It is negatively linked to analyst coverage (Chan and Hameed, 2006) . It is effectively associated with a strong correlation between current returns and future earnings (Durnev et al., 2003) . This supports the view that non synchronicity is a relevant measure of stock price informativeness, as these firms incorporate more information about their future earnings in their current stock price.
Informativeness has been used in multiple domains of finance. The basic idea is the same:
an event lead or should lead to a disclosure of specific information not known or appraised before, and informativeness compared after and before the event should improve.
These events may be external constraints. For instance, Beuselinck et al. (2010) uses the informativeness measure to examine the consequences of IFRS adoption in 2005 in Europe.
They expect informativeness to increase because the new accounting norms are higher than the previous ones. Loureiro and Taboada (2011) examine the individual firms which voluntarily adopt IFRS in EU and non EU countries. They document an increase in stock price informativeness for "early" voluntary IFRS adopters.
Another avenue of research follows the idea that managers can learn from stock price information regarding the prospects of their own firms. When comparing two firms, the price of the firm with better informativeness will help its managers take better decisions.
Firm managers learn from the private information in stock prices about their own firms' fundamentals and incorporate this information into corporate investment decisions. Durnev, Morck, and Yeung (2004) find that firms with a high level of price non-synchronicity make more efficient investment decisions in the sense that their marginal Tobin's Q is closer to one. Chen et al. (2007) also examine corporate investment decisions.
They show that investment to price sensitivity, i.e. the marginal willingness of the firm to invest, is higher when a firm shows better informativeness. Frésard (2012) investigates corporate cash holding decisions. He shows that private information about stock price (i.e. informativeness), is positively linked to a firm's saving choices.
Informativeness measured by non-synchronicity is used in the literature for cross country comparisons. Morck et al. (2000) show that developed financial systems favor informativeness in a cross-country analysis. Wurgler (2000) compares sensitivity to investment among countries using a similar methodology. Jin and Myers (2006) compare different stock markets using a R2 measurement.
Informativeness is not a structural or permanent situation. It exists as an endogenous mean reverting process in the stock market informativeness. Dasgupta, Gan, and Gao (2010) develop a model in which an increase in transparency leads to lower stock price synchronicity (R2) in the short-term, but higher stock price synchronicity in the long-term.
The rationale for it is that a change in transparency improves the informativeness of stock prices about future events. Once new information is incorporated, a steady state develops and synchronicity recovers its long-term value.
Informativeness and buyback decisions are analyzed by La Bruslerie (2013) . Share repurchase is a discretionary decision which is a signal to shareholders. It induces the delivery of private information. The variation in synchronicity is used to check if informativeness moves accordingly. No systematic and univocal link between buyback decision and synchronicity move is evidenced in an empirical study on US and European firms.
Acquisitions and asymmetry of information
The process of mergers and acquisitions develops in a context of a double information asymmetry between the acquiring and target firms. Hansen (1987) was the first to mention the so-called "double lemons effect", where each one has private information about his own value and has incomplete information on the nature of the assets he receives. The bidder buys assets of uncertain value. Being risk averse, he or she is willing to pay less when facing an information risk. He may also want to share the valuation risk by paying with equity of the newly merged group. The target shareholders will receive shares based on a new economic project based on forecasted profits and synergies. They may also insure themselves by receiving cash and avoiding share payment. Asymmetries of information will explain the risk-sharing attitudes of the buyer and the seller and consequently the choice of a mix of payment.
A risk-sharing explanation of acquisition prices and terms was developed by Berkovitch and Narayanan (1990) who introduced the sharing of the synergy gains between the buyer and the target firm's shareholders into the analysis. The seller's appropriation of the synergy gains is linked to the difference in information between the two parties. Chang and Mais (1998) expanded the idea that an exchange of information can help to solve the problem of double information asymmetry. They introduced a prior holding in the target's capital (a "toehold") as a means to reduce the buyer's asymmetry of information. In such a situation the buyer has a better inside knowledge of the target, especially if he holds a large portion of capital (Goldman and Qian, 2005) .
In a framework of double asymmetry of information, paying with stocks will allow for risk sharing. A joint agreement sets the price, i.e. the acquisition premium, and the means of payment. When a mixed payment is used, it implies the calculation of the optimal ratio for cash/share payments. La Bruslerie (2012) highlights the tradeoff between the percentage paid in cash and the percentage of the economic gain of the whole acquisition captured by the target's shareholders.
The payment mix may retroactively influence the offer price and the acquisition premium.
The final takeover price is sensitive to the design of the payment scheme and the disclosure of pieces of private information which occurs during the negotiation process. The means of payment can be viewed as a signal to the market. Most analyses assume a situation in which the acquirer has better private information about the overall outcome of the acquisition than the target. The shareholders of the target firm have less information on its future value. A 100% cash offer is a good signal; the buyer has sufficient reliable information about the target. An empirical study by Megginson, Morgan, and Nail (2004) on the long-term performance resulting from mergers confirms that a cash payment is a reliable signal of the future creation of value. The long-term underperformance of purely stock-financed deals, which is consistent with the results of Megginson et al. (2004) has been demonstrated by Loughran and Vijh (1997) , André, Kooli, and L'Her (2004) and Antoniou and Zhao (2004) .
The market-signaling role of the means of payment was also studied within several eventstudy works (Amihud et al., 1990; Bellamy & Lewin, 1992; Martin, 1996; Houston and Ryngaert, 1997; Travlos, 1987) . Similar studies were proposed by Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) in the United States and by Da Silva Rosa et al. (2003) in Australia. Goergen and Renneboog (2004) also provide evidence of the role of the means of payment with a sample of public European offers. However, these studies were mostly based on 100% cash or 100% share payments. Previous works have not explicitly considered the very specific case of the hybrid payment scheme. Thus a specific regime of payment has developed involving double information asymmetry between an acquiring firm and a target company (La Bruslerie, 2012) .
-Informativeness and Hypotheses

Measuring informativeness
The signaling theory has been tested by viewing only the market reaction identified through CARs. However, if the idea is that the set of information associated with an acquisition process is complex, market reaction will not be a sufficient tool. It may effectively correct past undervaluation, and thus CARs are well adapted measures.
However, when considering future prospects, signaling mean incorporating specific and new information that was not known before. In that context where future changes and prospects are questioned, the acquisition expands the set of specific idiosyncratic information and consequently the firm's systematic risk. Thus, the CAR may be an insufficient measure. This is why, for instance, Grullon and Michaely (2004) examine the long term operational performance of the firm.
We need another measure of the signaling content of share repurchase to complement the immediate market reaction which can be mixed or moderated, and we introduce the larger idea of informativeness. The signal covers private information useful to the market participants. If it is not useful, it is not pure noise. This information is specifically oriented to the firm's prospects and is not linked to the global market return. The quantity of private information spread into the stock price is measured by a decrease in synchronicity of the stock price versus the market moves because the specific risk of the stock has increased. If the information is useless or the signal poor, the specific risk will stay the same, along with the synchronicity.
The non-synchronicity as a measure of the specific private information delivered to the market is calculated using the R2 variable. This measure was first introduced by Roll (1988) . As explained by Durnev, Morck and Yeung (2004) , in the absence of firm-specific information, a firm's stock return varies only because of exogenous shocks in industry and market returns. In contrast, the presence of firm specific information magnifies stock price, rendering the returns as being less correlated with market and industry returns. Hence, stock prices informativeness increases when the return on a stock becomes less correlated with the market and industry returns.
The R2 are calculated using weekly price moves and using windows of observations before and after a transaction. We will consider two different windows of respectively one year and 32 weeks before and after the announcement. Weekly observations are better suited because sometimes daily moves are not available. Thus, missing dates are often replaced in databases by doubling the previous quote. This generates artificial zero moves in the regressions. In line with Durnev, Morck and Yeung (2004) , we choose weekly return observations. The following models are estimated:
Subscript t belongs either to the "before" or the "after" windows.
The first equation (1) is a simple market model. It is used as a benchmark to assess the importance of the industry effect. We regress the industry index on the market index in (2).
This regression takes into account the known fact that industry indexes are rather strongly correlated with market indexes. From this we get residuals εs,t which are used in our R2 model. This is a way to achieve uncorrelated explicative variables. The test of the significance of the industry indexes is preferably suited to using this two-step model. Of course, the R2 of a regression which directly uses the two indexes Rm and Rs as explicative variables is the same at the end.
The indexes used are the Stoxx600 index for European firms and the Stoxx North America 600. The Stoxx 600 Europe index covers 18 European countries and is euro based. The Stoxx 600 North America index covers US and Canadian firms and is US dollar based. Both have industry sub-indexes. We used 19 industry or sector categories.
To compute the synchronicity measure, we follow Morck et al. (2000) and define stock return synchronicity as:
where R2 is the coefficient of determination obtained from estimating the model (3). We may recall that synchronicity is the inverse of informativeness. The log transformation changes the R2 variable, bound by zero and one, into a continuous variable with a more normal distribution. This is commonly referred to in the literature (Durnev, Morck and Yeung, 2004) .
To calculate the R2 coefficients, we consider alternatively two windows, before the announcement date and after it. Durnev et al. (2003) and Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) compute the stock return synchronicity for calendar year. This approach is not relevant here because a possible breakdown is not linked to calendar year but to the random announcement of a transaction. A neutral period around the announcement date is acknowledged. This period is [-15 , +15] days on either side of the announcement date. We may decide to neutralize the 15 days before, because the acquisition project may be diffused to privileged investors or to analysts. So the stock price may move due to insiders.
The same reason suggests considering a premium computed 2 to 4 weeks before the transaction date (Martynova and Renneboog, 2009) . A time period of 15 days after the announcement date is necessary for the propositions to be assessed by investors. The process is not completed until a majority of investors accept it. Sometimes shareholders need to get more information, or may want to know the recommendations of the board when facing an unsolicited bid, or may wait for possible reaction of a white knight, or for possible bargaining or a revision of the terms of the initial proposition. A delay of 15 days allows the offer to stabilize and achieve more certainty. We consider a one year window when calculating the R2 values (as in Durnev et al. 2003, Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004) . This is why the R2 are calculated over large windows before [-380, -15 ] days and after [15, 380] days with t=0 being the announcement date. A shorter time frame of 32 weeks has been alternatively used. In that event we have considered a neutral period of [-7, +7 ] days around the announcement date. The windows to calculate the R2 values are respectively 32 weeks before and 32 weeks after the neutral period. Thus, in this shorter time frame, the two calculation periods are [-231, -7] days before and [7, 231] -Targets and acquirers excluding financial firms or government and agencies.
The basic sample includes 1276 firms. These restricted criteria are chosen to achieve significant transactions at the acquirer level. Small deals will not put the acquirer in a situation where disclosing information is important. Looking at developed countries shows that public acquisitions should conform to a regulated process, either in the EU or in the USA. This implies the delivery of some information to the target shareholders. The restriction that the acquirer should come from the same country avoids exotics takeovers where the bidders do have not the same pressure to disclose information when they are listed for instance in China or Russia. The quality of financial information is not the same. As far as we want to measure the specific private information in the acquirer's market using the stock price, we need this market to be regulated and to be submitted to homogenous regulations. Also, we eliminate buyback or self-tender transactions (and divestitures such as split offs or spin offs) representing 437 transactions (including 11 spin and split offs).
The considerations and means of payment available in the Thomson Financial database have been screened. An unknown structure of payment refers to private transactions. The split between cash, shares on other considerations has been reviewed in that some inconsistencies may appear when looking at a synopsis of the transaction. Liability payments (and convertible bond and preference share payments) are considered to be equivalent to cash payment, and the percentage paid in cash has been recalculated. We restricted the hybrid payment category to refer to mixed cash/share payment where the percentage paid in cash is between 0% and 100%. Payments using warrants were assimilated into share payments.
The private information model is measured by non-synchronicity. In terms of construction, the higher values of this variable reflect the higher stock return synchronicity and the lower firm-specific informativeness of stock prices. We would expect the R2 to decrease between "before" and "after" because of the delivery of some private information due to the completion of the acquisition process.
We can consider two samples of R2 data. The first one uses any transaction from the basic 1276 observations sample. When restricting the basic sample only to mergers and acquisitions without buybacks (and split offs or spin offs) and eliminating non cash or shares payments, we get 830 observations. After the elimination of missing data in the data base, and of observations without enough data to compute the R2 values, we are left with 599 and 600 couples of R2 estimates for external acquisitions.
INSERT TABLE 1   Table 1 shows that the mean R2 has increased from before to after the transaction. This seems contradictory to our basic hypothesis of improvement of private information due to the nature of the process of a deal. The raw values of the synchronicity show the same pattern with an increase in the S values moving from -0.84 to -0.66. The difference between before and after is significant when considering the usual 5% level. However we need to take into account the fact that, within the same period, global industry synchronicity has improved considerably. The average R2 of the industry indexes when regressed on the market index, has improved from 0.58 to 0.62. This phenomenon may explain part of the increase of the individual R2 values. We need to correct the individual synchronicity by deflating the move in the industry synchronicity. When doing this we get a synchronicity measure which is lower after the announcement compared to before the announcement (-1.15 before, decreasing to -1.22 after the acquisition). The difference in difference is negative (-0.07 for the 52 weeks window and -0.03 for the 32 weeks window). On average the corrected synchronicity decreases over time as expected. However a t-test does not confirm that the difference-in-difference is significant. Winsorizing data does not change the conclusion of a diff-in-diff average value which is still negative and indicates a decrease in corrected synchronicity.
Hypotheses
We can formulate the following hypotheses about informativeness in stock price. We focus on variations in informativeness due to an acquisition event. Basically we suppose that this will go with the delivery of new and private information to the market. This is due to the process of acquisition and the agreement of the financial terms of the deal by both the acquirer and the seller.
Firstly, we can imagine that a homogeneous information context will facilitate the process of disclosure of new specific information. When the target and the acquirer are facing the same regulations, the same accounting rules, the same legal context, it will result in better informativeness. This should be the case when looking at domestic transactions developed in the same country (H1a). It may also be relevant when considering a region in the world where the same regulations, the same accounting principles and similar practices for acquisitions have been developed. This is the case in the European Union. As a corollary, if the hypothesis is valid and if the context partially explains the information diffusion process, we may have regional and local differences in informativeness changes (H1b). When a deal is challenged, the competitor will disclose more information. Implicit in this is the idea that the information delivered in the acquisition process is relevant and useful (H2). We can also imagine that competitors will disclose poor information and/or unattainable forecasts. As a consequence, if the quality of information is low, it may not result in a superior informativeness compared to a non-challenged deal and H2 will be false. Hybrid payments are specific. All-cash and all-share payments are less informationally optimal because they are "corner solutions". Mixed cash-share payments are fine-tuned and may cope with the risk of asymmetric information to which the seller and the buyer are exposed.
H5: Hybrid means of payment are particularly suited to disclosing private information and will develop informativeness.
The size of the deals will influence the process. The disclosure of new and private information is costly. The size of the transaction may spread over this cost and large deals may facilitate the diffusion of new information. Conversely this "acquirer's supply" hypothesis may be challenged by an informational request from the target's shareholders who may need to be convinced to accept the deal. A contractual analysis of a transaction where the agreement comes from both side does not depend directly (although possibly indirectly) on the size of the deal. The alternate to H6 is the "contractual demand" hypothesis.
H6: The size of the transactions will positively impact on the disclosure of private information and consequently informativeness.
Variables and descriptive statistics
CARs and market reaction at the announcement
We calculate CARs by looking at a window of two calendar weeks around an announcement date. The announcement date occurs during a business day. So the effective window is -5 business days and + 5 business days around the event. We can look at abnormal returns in two ways. A simple CAR calculation subtracts the relevant market index return from the stock return. This gives a negative average abnormal return of -0.52%. The standard CAR is calculated using the market model returns and subtracting it from the stock returns. The market model is estimated on a previous window of weekly returns from t-33w to t-1w; i.e. 32 weekly observations. It gives a negative average CAR value of -0.76%. The CARs are not significantly different from zero (see Table 2 ).
INSERT TABLE 2 3.2 Stock market moves
We calculate the stock market moves before and after the announcement. We neutralize a period of one week before and one week after the announcement date. The stock price move is calculated during a 32 weeks window before and a 32 weeks window after i.e. [t33w, t-1w] and [t+1w, t+33w] . During these two periods we calculate the stock return deflated by the corresponding market index return.
INSERT TABLE 3
The stock move before the acquisition (+8.6%) is positive before the announcement, and significantly different from zero. Post event moves (+5.0%) are also significant. The transaction is appraised by its value (TRANS_VALUE). The characteristics of the deals are identified through dummies: challenged deals, purely domestic (i.e. within one country) transactions or same sector transactions. We set up dummies if the transaction develops with targets and acquirers located within Europe or North America. These broader economic zones underline the economic integration of countries, particularly in Europe.
The acquirer may have a "toehold" stake before transaction. We use a dummy DUM_TOE.
The means of payment is a key dimension in a deal. We considered three possible regimes of payment: full cash, full share or mixed cash/share payment (DUM_HYBRID). The variable PERC_CASH provides the percentage of cash payment in the deal for each transaction. Two variables are built to assess the asymmetry of information between the acquirer and the target. We considered that the relative size of the target compared to the acquirer is a relevant proxy for potential asymmetry of information. It does not measure the unknown asymmetry of information but the potential risk for one party attached to information on the other one. It was introduced by Hansen (1987) . Just as he does, we use the ratio of book net asset (ASYMMETRY). We also refer to the amount at stake from the acquirer point of view which is the value of transaction in the numerator of ASYMMETRY2. The percentage of target shares acquired in the transaction is PERC_ACQD_SHARES.
Market data are assessed through the excess return of the acquirer's stock price before the transaction (EXRETB). This takes a possible run up effect into account. The RUNUP variable will cross a possible excess stock return with the payment of the deals by share. The premium at the announcement date (PREMIUM) is calculated using a four week time lag.
The abnormal return around the announcement date (CAR) is considered, as well as it absolute value (ABSCAR). A proxy to take into account possible disequilibrium between offer and supply during the transaction is introduced by subtracting the percentage of shares sought by the initiator and the percentage he effectively gets after the deal (DISEQ).
The change in informativeness compared before and after the transaction is VAR_S1Y. It is obtained by subtracting the synchronicity as estimated before from the synchronicity estimates after the acquisition. Due to the two sets of windows of measurement we also have the VAR_31W variable. The list of the variables is displayed in Annex and Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics of the sample.
INSERT TABLE 5
Empirical tests
We need to see if the same determinants will explain the CAR and the synchronicity variables. If the determinants are the same and play in the same way, this will prove that the synchronicity measure is worthless and that the informativeness is totally effective when the transaction is done. At a second step, we will see if the CARs explain the subsequent variation in synchronicity or not and as such contribute to increase the stock price informativeness.
Determinants of CARs
The CARs are a market reaction to acquisitions. A first look at identifies a very low correlation (0.00) between the CAR and VAR_S1Y variables. As a measure of new information spread in the market, we could consider that VAR_S1Y will explain the move in stock price at the transaction date. If so, private information will be disclosed continually and the price will change.
The information delivered, as proxied by the VAR_S1Y variable, may yield two possible signals: the private information may be positive or negative. A decrease (or increase) in synchronicity does not imply a positive or negative market reaction. This is why we do not expect the VAR_S1Y variable to explain the magnitude of CARs. Table 6 presents the regression of the determinants of CARs. The variable VARS1Y is tested in Equations 1-3 and VAR_31W is in Equation 4. They are all non-significant. We cannot say that an increase in private information is a priori relevant and will cause a positive or negative market reaction. The conclusion is that CARs react to public information disclosed with the transaction. The market reactions are ex ante neither positive nor negative. The constant in any regressions of Table 6 are never significant. This is in line with the average value of CARs on average negative but not significantly different from zero (see Table 2 ).
INSERT TABLE 6
As regressors, we consider the two key terms of an acquisition: premium and means of payment. Elements of context of the transaction may also explain the size of the CARs: the size of the transaction (either in absolute value or relatively, compared to the acquiring firm), domestic acquisitions or not and deals within the EU zone as opposed to North American deals. The differences in the situation may explain the asymmetry of information for the acquirer's shareholders. If the transaction is small, the amount that is invested is limited, along with the risk of loss. The risk exposure is relative as we use the ASYMMETRY2 variable which is the ratio of the transaction value to the acquirer's book value. The disequilibrium variable DISEQ corresponds to the difference between the percentage of shares sought in the deal and the percentage effectively acquired. This discrepancy between demand and supply may explain price moves in the acquisition process. Table 6 shows that only few variables are candidates to explain the CARs. The premium or cash percentages in the payment are not significant. This may seem paradoxical as it is widely documented that payment in cash will result in higher (or less negative) CARs. A cash payment stands as a good signal. This fact is acknowledged in our data when running a partial regression of CARs with PERC_CASH. The CARs in a situation of full-share payment is -2.3%. If the payment is 100% in cash, the average CAR is only -0.3%. Per se, a cash payment turns the negative reaction to a close to zero abnormal return. However this result is only a pure association because cash/share payments are endogenous variables in the transaction. They are detrained by other factors such as information asymmetries. The partial correlation between percentage of cash payment and asymmetry of information is negative and strongly significant. Higher asymmetry will lead to the joint setting of a lower premium and a cash payment. This point is documented in Ismael and Krause (2010) or in La Bruslerie (2013) . Hybrid payment is a specific regime of payment per se. We can show that theoretically the disclosure of private information should be higher with hybrid payments as the fine tuning of the cash/share mix discloses more private information than the "corner solution" of a 100 % cash or 100 % share payment. A dummy variable signals hybrid payment schemes. They are complex and presumably fine-tuned in order to manage the double asymmetry of information (La Bruslerie, 2012) . When PERC_CASH and PREMIUM variables are on the right hand side of the model with the ASYMMETRY2 variable, the model is badly specified as the characteristics of the deals are not independent from the level of ASYMMETRY2. Moreover, the ASYMMETRY2 variable is strongly significant and it suggests that a situation of asymmetry of information will influence the premiums level and the cash percentage payment, rather than the reverse. When PREMIUM (Eq.5 to 6) and PER_CASH (Eq. 3-6) are removed, the significance of ASYMMETRY2 remains and is not polluted by endogenous relationship. The DUM_HYBRID variable is positively significant in four regressions at the 5 or 10% level. It is not redundant with the PERC_CASH variable. Mixed cash-share payments follow a specific regime of payment. La Bruslerie (2013) shows that the mix is linked with the premium and follows a specific rationale. It discloses more information than the transaction offers and is a positive signal. If we look at the estimated coefficients in Equations 5 and 6, these balance the overall negative CAR reaction by +1.8 to 1.9%.
The variable ASYMMETRY2 is strongly significant with a negative sign: a higher risk of information asymmetry induces a negative CAR at the acquirer's level. This is a way to internalize in public price the risk attached to private information. When a deal is challenged, the risk of overpayment of the target firm may develop. However, this variable is not significant and the CARs is not negatively influenced. Other contextual variables are not significant to explain abnormal returns: same sector acquisitions, domestic acquisitions, or within Europe acquisitions will not imply significantly lower abnormal returns. The absolute size of the transaction TRANS_VALUE is not significant in explaining the abnormal returns. The relative stock price movement in the last year (EXRETB) identifies a possible run up in the stock price. If the stock price experiences an excess return in the period preceding the acquisition, a transaction may signal an overpriced stock. The CAR reaction to EXRETB is negative and significant. The magnitude of the coefficient in Equations 4 and 5 is around -5.5%. This means that a stock overperformance is corrected when an acquisition occurs and leads the investor to assess the value of the acquiring firms. When using the RUNUP variable in Eq.5, we try to proxy the signal issued to investors when the acquirer uses overvalued stocks to finance external acquisitions. The RUNUP variable considers stock performance only for share financed acquisitions. Its coefficient is significant in Eq.5 and its magnitude increases slightly to -6%. The CARs are explained not only by the acquisition project in itself but also because the investors will reassess the share value and deals may signal stock overvaluation. The DISEQ variable is not significant. When we use the VAR_31W variable as a regressor instead of VAR_S1Y (see Eq.4), we get similar results.
We can now consider the absolute magnitude of abnormal returns. The dependent variable is ABSCAR. Table 7 presents the results. The only significant variable is DISEQ. The discrepancy between demand and supply does not explain the sign of CARs but its magnitude. The larger the discrepancy, the larger the CAR. The latter appears not only to be a signal or a reaction to new information, but also a consequence of a technical imbalance in the transaction when the acquirer does not get the quantity of shares he or she wants.
INSERT Descriptive analysis has shown that on average VAR_S1Y is no different from zero. As a result in the regression we can expect the constant to be non-significant. This is confirmed in Equations 1 and 2, as displayed in Table 8 . As a control variable we use the CARs. We expect a possible balancing relationship with important and positive CARs involving the disclosure of private and specific information at the date of announcement and, as a consequence, resulting in a lower synchronicity. The CAR variable is never significant in the regressions (see Table 8 , Equations 1 to 11). The immediate market reaction does not increase informativeness in the stock price. The market reaction at the date of the transaction does not involve a better informativeness in the stock price, as suggested by more idiosyncratic information on the stock price.
INSERT TABLE 8
We tested if the terms of the acquisition, namely the means of payment characteristics and the premium, could convey some private information to the market. The PERC_CASH variable is not significant in Equations 1 to 3. This is due to the PREMIUM variable which enters into the model. These two variables represent two sides of the transaction agreement. They are jointly determined and as such they are not independent. Their partial correlation is strong and positive (0.16). However, Eq.1 assumes wrongly that the terms of payment and premium are uncorrelated. An acquisition is a deal where the terms are jointly set. The acquisition price (i.e. the premium) and the means of payment are thus mutually dependent. A positive trade-off relationship exists between these characteristics. Premiums will be 12% higher if the payment is conducted fully in cash (ceteris paribus). We need to drop one of these two. This is why the results of Equation 1and Equation 3 should be disregarded. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the terms of the transactions are endogenous in the setting and are determined (among other variables) by the relative asymmetry of information between the acquirer and the target. Equation 2, which integrates ASYMMETRY, is dubious because these regressors are endogenous. 4 To assess the role of the terms of the transaction PREMIUM or PERC_CASH, we need to consider model referring, either to PERC_CASH alone (Equations 4 to 7 and 10 to 11) or PREMIUM (Equations 8 and 9). Equation 3, in which both PERC_CASH end PREMIUM are explicative, is informative and shows that we can be misled and ignore PERC_CASH as a determinant because it is hidden by the PREMIUM variable. The means of payment, particularly the percentage paid in cash which was outlined to be non-significant to explain the abnormal returns, appears as a key driver to increase the informativeness of a stock price. The percentage of cash shows a negative significant coefficient. It means than a higher cash payment or a full cash payment will increase informativeness and deliver a useful signal incorporated as specific information in the stock price. If considered alone, the premium variable now becomes strongly significant in Equations 8 and 9. A high premium delivers some private information about the future value of the transaction, particularly the expected synergies.
We can conclude that the tradeoff level of the acquisition terms is significant, either considered from the premium side or the cash payment side. High premiums or full cash payment convey information on the future prospects of the merged firm. This may signal good private expected profits. The DUM_HYBRID variable is not significant. It has already been taken into account in the CARs. Variables of context, such as challenged deals, the existence of a toehold and private acquisition, are not significant. However the WITHIN_EUROPE dummy is significant and positive in Equations 5 to 9. It is not significant in Equations 10 and 11. If positiveness were clearly confirmed it would mean that European deals would increase synchronicity and contribute negatively to the informativeness in the stock price. The hypothesis that the informativeness process linked to acquisitions is lower in Europe is still under consideration but not settled.
Equations 10 and 11 explore the tradeoff relationship between the level of the premium and the cash payment feature. As a first step we regress the premium with regard to the percentage of cash variable and a constant. The PERC_CASH variable is of course strongly significant in this regression (p: 0.00). We take the residual of this regression and create the RESIDPRE variable. As this is orthogonal to the percentage of cash, we can integrate RESIDPRE as a regressor in Equations 10 and 11 along with PERC_CASH. RESIDPRE is a proxy of all the elements in the premium which is not explained by the tradeoff relationship with the means of payment. Looking at Equations 10 and 11 we show that RESIDPRE is not significant to improve informativeness. This means that PERC_CASH is a fair proxy for the terms of the acquisition. What is left in the premium variable and is not linked with the percentage of cash payment, does not help to explain the variations of informativeness.
The disclosure of the private information depends on the size of the transaction. The TRANS_VALUE variable is significant and increases synchronicity. Large acquisitions will reduce informativeness in the acquirer's stock market price. This may seem paradoxical and opposite to our hypothesis. We can imagine the following explanation: large acquisitions make things more complex to forecast for analysts because the future prospects of the merged firm will depend more largely on the acquired firms. For instance the analysts who follow the acquiring firm have to become more familiar with the characteristics of the acquired business. The impact of a small acquisition is lower because it is only marginal compared to the core business of the acquiring firm. To confirm this analysis, we use the VALUE_CASH variable which crosses the percentage of the deal paid in cash and the transaction value. It focuses on the amount which is really at risk in an acquisition. A share payment can be seen as an insurance policy for the target's shareholders. In Equations 7, 8 and 10, the VALUE_CASH coefficient is less systematically positive (only two times upon three and only at the 10% level). A lower amount of cash at risk will have a lower incidence for the acquirer's stock price.
As a result we can show that the set of variables relevant to explain the CARs around the announcement date (hybrid payment specific regime, the potential asymmetry of information, and the pre-transaction excess return or alternatively the RUNUP feature) are not the same as the variables which are significant to explain the changes in the informativeness of the stock price (PERC_CASH or alternatively PREMIUM, the global size of the transaction TRANS_VALUE or alternately the size at risk which is the amount effectively paid in cash, VALUE_CASH, and the WITHIN_EUROPE dummy). The difference in the sets of explicative variables explains why CAR, as a regressor of the VAR_S1Y variable, is not significant. The direction of the CAR variable, from negative to positive abnormal, is not significant to explain variation in synchronicity, i.e. better or lower informativeness.
However if the sign of the signal is not relevant, maybe its magnitude is. Table 9 presents the results of regressions, using ABSCAR as a regressor. It is moderately significant (at the 5% or 10% level). An important move in CARs at the acquisition announcement date has a positive link with synchronicity. The relationship of large abnormal returns is negative with regard to informativeness in the market. The other variables have signs similar to those evidenced in Table 8 . A percentage of the payment in cash will increase informativeness, European deals and the size of the acquisition will hamper it. The dummy for hybrid payment appears significant and negative at the 10% level.
INSERT TABLE 9
This leads to the conclusion that (i) CAR does not cover all the information features, (ii) private information is disclosed and modifies the synchronicity of the target's stock price in the market, (iii) this diffusion process is not systematic and sometimes informativeness improves. Sometimes informativeness is lower after the deal and on average it does not improve or deteriorate, (iv) the means of payment and the premium are public information but they convey some information about the private perspectives of return and synergies ensuing from the acquisition, (iv) the size of the transaction lessens the informativeness of the acquirer's stock price.
Robustness checks
Previously we used the observed values of CARs as a regressor of the variation in synchronicity, VAR_S1Y. We can also introduce a two-step linear regression setup. The first regression estimates CAR according to the Equation 6 in Table 6 . We get fitted value of cumulative abnormal returns, CARFIT, and orthogonal residuals, RESIDCAR. The later integrates all the elements of observed CARSs not in the model. Equation 1 in Table 10 adds RESIDCAR as the regressor. The latter is the excessive market reaction at an announcement according to its rationally expected value. The coefficient of RESIDCAR is not significant.
The excessive reaction is not associated with a movement in synchronicity. In Equations 2 and 3 we add CARFIT as regressor. The observed values of CARs may show excessive market reactions (from above or below) with a random noise. We can check if the "true" value of abnormal return explains the variation in synchronicity and informativeness. This hypothesis is not confirmed with Equations 2 and 3, in which the CARFIT coefficient is not significant.
INSERT TABLE 10
When comparing Tables 6 and 8, it seems that CARs and variations in synchronicity follow different information diffusion processes and focus on different sets of information. They are independent. However we need to investigate further if a joint process to explain the immediate market reaction at announcement and the variation in synchronicity can be found. Separate regressions will hide possible interactions. For instance, the hybrid payment status may be significant to explain both the CARs and the VAR_S1Y variables. We use a set of two simultaneous equations in Models 1 and 2 with one equation estimating the CARs (Eq1) and the other the variations in synchronicity (Eq2). They differ in the equation modeling of VAR_S1Y, with CAR as a regressor in Model 1 and ABSCAR in Model 2. The results are similar to those in univariate estimation. The abnormal returns are negatively influenced by the previous excess returns in the stock market and by asymmetry in information. The hybrid payment regime is now strongly positive. It is a signal which partly balances the risk of information asymmetry. The informativeness of the stock price is unaffected by the magnitude of the abnormal returns. The variable ABSCAR which has appeared to be moderately significant in Table 9 is no more significant. The size of the transaction is now insignificant in explaining the variation in synchronicity. The latter depends only on the terms of the acquisition (here the percentage paid in cash, or alternatively the premium in unreported regression). We added a third equation in Models 3 and 4 with the trade-off relation between percentage in cash payment and asymmetry of information, ASYMMETRY2. 5 This third equation is highly significant. The results are similar, as the non-significance of CAR or ABSCAR is confirmed. 6 The dummy WITHIN_EUROPE is significant at the 10% level and gives us the idea that the informativeness process works better in the USA than in Europe.
INSERT TABLE 11
Our hypotheses work better when we look at the results of simultaneous equations estimation:
-The hypothesis H1a is supported: The informativeness process ensuing from an acquisition seems to be different and better in North America than in Europe.
-The hypothesis H2 is not confirmed as challenged deals do not show superior informativeness.
-Cash payments (H3) and acquisition premiums (H4) are key variables which convey specific information about the perspectives of returns and synergies. A full cash payment and a large premium will improve the informativeness of an acquirer's stock price.
-Hybrid payments contribute particularly to better informativeness; they deliver a great deal of specific information attached to a transaction (H5).
5 If PREMIUM is used as a regressor in the third equations of Models 3 and 4, the results are unchanged. 6 Symmetrically, in not reported regressions, if VAR_S1Y is included as regressor in Equation 1. it is not significant.
-The size of the transaction does not interfere in the informativeness process (H6). We do not have better informativeness in large deals. What is important in an acquisition is its contractual nature, as the target's shareholders need to be informed and convinced first.
Conclusion
Acquisition is an event which globally discloses private information about the market. On average, the move in synchronicity is negative but the descriptive analysis show that this variation is not systematically different from the null value. Looking at each firm or each deal individually gives contrasting results: the informativeness of idiosyncratic stock prices may increase or may not increase. Which variable or characteristic conveys private and specific information to the market and effectively increases informativeness? Our empirical test shows that a lowering in synchronicity depends mainly on the terms of the transactions. The premium and the means of payment are key observable parameters and disclose information on the future project after merging. In particular, a cash payment and its companion variable, a high acquisition premium, are signals. A cash payment (or a high acquisition premium) is a proxy for large future cash flows resulting from the acquisition either directly from the merged target company or from synergies. If these future specific cash flows are small, they do not modify the appraisal of the firm by the investors and its synchronicity is unchanged. A hybrid payment amplifies the phenomenon as it cumulates its negative effect to improve informativeness. A mixed cash-share payment will deliver specific information because it implies an optimization process to determine the percentage of cash payment compared to the share payment. Its rational setting leads to a sophisticated signal to investors. The question arises as to whether this process of delivering private information alongside the development of an acquisition transaction is equally efficient in the US and in European markets. Our results show a more efficient process in North American markets.
The disclosure process of private and specific information is not linked with the way the market reacts to an announcement date. The determinants of abnormal returns are different to those causing an increase in informativeness. Traditionally, CARs are on average negative at the announcement of an acquisition. However, they are very different in terms of size and sign. Although they are globally negative, they are not significant. The contractual rationale aiming at an agreement in a situation of information asymmetry is supported by our data.
The CARs as proxy variables of the information incorporated in the stock market price seem incomplete. They correspond to a change in value and they constitute the market's immediate reaction in price to the creation (or destruction) of value ensuing from an acquisition. They also have a retrospective dimension as we show that they correct stock price over (or under)performance in the period before an acquisition. Informativeness has a larger sense. We show that the two dimensions of market's immediate reaction and informativeness are not redundant. Each one follows its rationale and is explained by a genuine set of determinants which are different. Informativeness focuses on the dimension of successful or unsuccessful disclosure of private information alongside the acquisition process. Sometimes, the information delivered is noisy or useless and does not improve the idiosyncratic dimension of the (newly merged) firm. Sometimes informativeness improves.
As such, informativeness underlines another dimension of the market for transfer of control. It has the well-known economic function of reallocation of capital and creation of value. It has also an informational function of disclosing information and improving informativeness to investors. As a consequence assessing acquisition only on the basis of their creation of value using CARs is not entirely satisfying. The efficiency of the market for control should also be assessed by examining its informational function. Multiplication of PERC_CASH and TRANS_VALUE.
VAR_S1Y
Variation of synchronicity after the event compared to before, S_AFTER1Y minus S_BEF1Y. Data are winsorized using the 1%-99% range.
VAR_S31W
Variation of synchronicity after the event compared to before, S_AFTER31W minus S_BEF31W. Data are winsorized using the 1%-99% range. ; R2winso: winsorized R2raw in the eliminating the lower 5% percentile and the upper 95% percentile; Synch raw: raw synchronicity measure S = log (R2/ (1-R2) ) where R2raw is used, Synchind: synchronicity measure of the industry index using R2industry; Synchdiff: Modified synchronicity using a correction where the synchronicity of the industry has been subtracted from the raw synchronicity; Diff-indiff : after announcement synchronicity minus before announcement; Synchdiff/winso: modified synchronicity where Synchraw has been winsorized; P-value: p-value of a T-test of the difference between before and after announcement variables; N=599 for the 32 weeks window and N=600 for the 52 weeks window)
WITHIN_AMERICA
Window 52w
Window 32w Table 9 Determinants of synchronicity moves with ABSCAR (European, Canadian and US acquisitions; completed deals with minimum transaction value of 100 million dollars; buybacks and self-tender transactions excluded; acquirers and targets are publicly listed and non-financial firms; deals with not enough observations to calculate synchronicity and CARs excluded ; dependent variable is VAR_S1Y: Variation in synchronicity between after and before the acquisition, synchronicity is calculated using one year windows; ASYMMETRY2: potential asymmetry of information, relative size of the transaction value compared to the acquirer's net book value; ABSCAR: absolute value of cumulative abnormal return around the announcement date, window of 5 business days before to 5 business days after the announcement date; DUM_HYBRID: Dummy for mixed cash-shares payment Table 10 Robustness checks (European, Canadian and US acquisitions; completed deals with minimum transaction value of 100 million dollars; buybacks and self-tender transactions excluded; acquirers and targets are publicly listed and non-financial firms; deals with not enough observations to calculate synchronicity and CARs excluded ; dependent variable is VAR_S1Y: Variation in synchronicity between after and before the acquisition, synchronicity is calculated using one year windows; ASYMMETRY2: potential asymmetry of information, relative size of the amount invested by the acquirer compared to its net book value; CAR: cumulative abnormal return around the announcement date, window of 5 business days before to 5 business days after the announcement date; CHALL_DEAL: Dummy for challenged deals; DUM_HYBRID: Dummy for mixed cash-shares payment; PREMIUM: Offer price to target stock price 4 weeks prior to announcement (%) PERC_CASH: Percentage of the transaction paid in cash; RUNUP: Excess stock return before transaction only for deals fully paid with shares; TRANS_VALUE: Value of transaction (M$); VALUE_CASH: Amount of cash invested in the transaction; WITHIN_EUROPE: Dummy if target and acquirer firms are from European countries; source: Thomson Financials; period 2000-2011, OLS corrected taking into account robust covariance estimators; Equations 1 to 3 are two-step OLS model with a first step regression of the CAR variable on constant, DUM_HYBRID, CHALL_DEAL, ASYMMETRY2 and RUNUP, see Eq.6 in Table 6 ; CARFIT: fitted value of CAR in the first step regression; RESIDCAR: variable is the residual of estimates; a: 1% significance level; b: 5% significance level; c: 10% significance level) 
Eq1
